Have Spanish companies built greater entrepreneurship after privatization? by Fernández, Zulima et al.
 1
 
Working Paper # 04-03 (03) 
Business Economics Series  
January 2004 
 
Sección de Organización de Empresas de Getafe
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Calle Madrid, 123
28903 Getafe (Spain)
Fax (34) 91 624 5707
 
 
HAVE SPANISH COMPANIES BUILT GREATER ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AFTER PRIVATIZATION? 
 
Zulima Fernández1 Ana María Romero Martínez2 and Elena Vázquez Inchausti3  
 
Abstract 
 
This study analyses some of the strategic and organizational changes experienced 
in  public firms following privatization in its double facet: sale of companies  and 
deregulation. Specifically, we analyse the process of innovation in terms of products, 
processes and organization. We also look into the development of new businesses and 
strategic renewal, which in the end shape the entrepreneurial capacity of a company. A 
sample of Spanish firms which were privatized between 1985 and 2000 shows that after 
privatization, these companies have experienced a significant increase in 
entrepreneurship. These changes are even more appreciable when a high sector 
competition is added to the ownership shift. Once they join the private sector, their level 
of product, process and organizational innovation is higher. They also develop new 
businesses at national level, reinforce their international activity and embark on strategic 
renewal processes by shedding the lesser profitable businesses and modifying their 
competitive strategy so as to gain efficiency. 
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“What we find most surprising about the privatization  
programs in the 80’s is neither their volume nor their scope,  
but the fact that they were adopted as an act of faith.  
(W. L. Megginson, R. C. Nash and M. Van Randenborgh, 1994: 404). 
 
Introduction 
Privatization processes are one of the most relevant economic phenomena of the 
late 20th century. From 1992 to 2001, resources generated by privatization in the 
European Community reached 340.765 million euros. In Spain the income for the same 
period was 38.734 million euros. It is worth noting that during the years 1997 and 1998, 
privatization activity reached its peak, with an income of 61.701 million euros in the EC 
and 13.083 million euros in Spain (Consejo Consultivo de Privatizaciones, 2002). 
 Most of the studies assessing the privatization process are focused on changes in 
the firm’s efficiency after joining the private sector both at international level (W. A. 
Andrews and M. J. Dowling, 1998; M. I. Cragg and  I. J. A. Dyck, 1991; J. D’Souza 
and W. L. Megginson, 1999; R. La Porta and F. López de Silanes, 1997; S. Martin and 
D. Parker, 1997; Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994; R. Millward and D. M. 
Parker, 1983; J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, 1988) and national level (A. Novales, C. 
Sebastián and J.A. Trujillo, 1987; I. Argimón, C. Artola and J. M. González-Páramo, 
1999; P. Hernández de Cos, I. Argimón and J. M. González-Páramo, 2004; L. A. 
Mañas, 1999; M. Melle, 1999; J. A. Sanchis, 1996; B. Villalonga, 2000); and they 
conclude that efficiency increases as a result of ownership shift and higher 
competitiveness in the sector. 
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Nevertheless, this line of research has been based on the static approach, or “black 
box” (A. Cuervo y B. Villalonga, 2000). No systematic analysis of contextual, 
organizational and strategic factors has been carried out to explain the variations 
observed in firms’ performance after privatization (except for Cuervo and Villalonga, 
2000; Martin and Parker, 1997). Therefore, there is only a partial view of privatization, 
especially if we consider that the concept includes two complementary phenomena: a) 
sale or transfer of ownership to the private sector; and b) the opening of markets to 
competitors. In fact, an ownership shift in itself does not necessarily involve any 
strategic change provided that the market remains protected, which would not require 
any specific active response on the part of the company. 
Partial or total sale of public capital to the private sector can be conducted in 
different ways, among which we can mention private sale to a direct buyer and public 
offering. In the first case, the company recently acquired must join the general strategy 
of the group taking over; in the second case, the securities market will put enough 
pressure to spark off all kinds of changes. Consequently, privatization is likely to induce 
strategic and organizational changes which could explain the different performance of 
companies. 
Among these changes, entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in terms of 
innovation, domestic and international new business entry and strategic renewal (W. D. 
Guth and A. Ginsberg, 1990; S. A. Zahra and J. Covin, 1995; S. A. Zahra, 1996; S. A. 
Zahra, D. O. Neubaum and  M. Huse, 2000). A number of studies on entrepreneurship 
have identified those factors which determine the degree of both aversion to risk and 
innovation. Some of them suggest that privatization could act as an entrepreneurship 
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booster among firms (S. A. Zahra y C. D. Hansen, 2000), which could certainly be the 
case when affected by a more aggresive sector competition1 
 Therefore, and considering the lack of research on strategic and organizational 
changes resulting from privatization, our objective is to analyse whether companies 
build greater entrepreneurship capacity during the post-privatization regime, and 
whether this capacity is affected by higher level of sector competition.  
 Using a sample of 38 non-financial Spanish firms, privatized between 1985 and 
2000, we will study the impact on the entrepreneurial capacity through the changes they 
experienced in terms of product, process, organizational and strategic innovation after 
privatization. Our findings suggest significant improvement in entrepreneurship, 
especially when accompanied by a high level of sector competition. 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section I summarizes the research on 
privatization and entrepreneurship. The methodology we have used is described in 
Section II. Section III shows the results of our empirical study. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions in Section IV. 
 
I. Have companies built greater entrepreneurship capacity after privatization? 
 The concept of entrepreneurship 
The concept of entrepreneurship has its origins in the literature on the individual 
entrepreneur (R. Cantillon, 1975; F. Knight, 1921; I. Kirzner, 1973; J. A. Schumpeter, 
1936, 1950) which other authors have extended to company level. In this latter sense, 
entrepreneurship is understood as a behaviour developed along a continuum, from 
strong conservatism to high entrepreneurship. It is assumed that entrepreneurial 
                                                           
1 Marshall (1907) was the first author to point out how the government is a poor innovator. Any 
government could do a good editing job of Shakespeare’s plays, however it could have never written 
them. (quoted by A. Shleifer, 1998: 138). 
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companies are less concerned with aversion to risk, more innovative and active as 
opposed to conservative ones (D. Miller, 1983). From the seminal Miller’s work 
onwards, a large number of researchers have used this conceptualization in their works 
(for example, B. Barringer and A. C. Bluedorn, 1999; J. Covin and D. Slevin, 1988, 
1991; G. T. Lumpkin and G. G. Dess, 1996; J. L. Naman and D. P. Slevin, 1993; H. H. 
Stevenson and J. C. Jarillo, 1990; S. A. Zahra, 1991, 1993; Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 
2000). 
 Taking Guth and Ginsberg’s proposal (1990)2 as a starting point, Zahra identifies 
three dimensions in entrepreneurship: innovation, new business creation and strategic 
renewal. Innovation involves the introduction of new products, production processes 
and organizational systems (Schumpeter, 1936). New business creation favours growth 
and company expansion to new markets offering its actual products as well as the 
ability to offer new products for the existing markets and also for new markets, either 
national or international. Strategic renewal involves restructuring of the firm activities 
by changing their business scope, approach or both. New business creation, 
international expansion and strategic renewal are the cornerstones of a dynamic 
conception of corporate strategy, which implies entering new businesses and markets 
and being prepared to leave them if necessary. Organizational changes can be 
understood as a consequence of previous strategic changes (A. D. Chandler, 1962) 
which require a revision of how activities are structured. Finally, innovation includes 
not only these changes but also the introduction of new products and processes. 
 
Privatization and entrepreneurship 
                                                           
2 For these authors, entrepreneurial activity at company level has two dimensions: innovation through 
business creation and activities and also strategic renewal.  
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Strictly speaking, privatization can be defined as any process aimed at shifting 
ownership and control from a public company to the private sector, and this is bound to 
have direct impact on the agency problem, typically associated with public companies 
and characterized by the following features (Z. Fernández, 1994): 
a) The fact that the public purpose results in a series of ill-defined, multiple and 
changeable objectives, sometimes even contradictory, is to be added to the general 
principal-agent problem. 
b) There isn’t just one single agency relationship but several relationships linked 
together, since those in charge of exerting control over public managers (government 
employees and politicians) are ultimately voters’ agents and their responsibility is, 
among others, to manage and control public companies on their behalf.  
 c) The usual mechanisms to control management discretionality in the private 
sector do not occur here. They are replaced by administrative control mechanisms and 
are mainly concerned with verifying observance of norms and procedures. 
 Although public companies are expected to satisfy public interests, the 
assumption that public interests can be represented by a well-defined function 
maximized by the government is nevertheless a “heroic” one (Vickers  and Yarrow, 
1988: 29). On the contrary, multiple groups of interests come together in a public 
company, each attempting to monopolize part of the rents generated by the company in 
the claim that the company was created to achieve some public objective, which is often 
the same as their own. Some of the imposed objectives they are supposed to achieve are 
to provide certain goods and services under preferential conditions, to secure 
employment, to guarantee a good standard of living in a particular area or to promote 
activities considered to be strategic. These objectives are eventually modified by the 
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power equilibrium and their simultaneous accomplishment is hard –if not impossible– 
to achieve.   
 Public managers are likely to seek objectives related to their own utility 
function, such as growth (Y. Aharoni, 1981; R. J. Monsen and K. D. Walters, 1980), 
sales (R. Rees, 1974) or public support (R. E. Caves, 1990). Profit, on the other hand, is 
not usually a priority. Many of them would rather achieve neutral results, neither profits 
nor heavy losses, since external visibility of the company is thus avoided, together with 
the demands of the pressure groups and public control (S. Lioukas, D. Bourantas and V. 
Papadakis, 1993). 
 We should not forget the fact that public companies are beyond market 
discipline and also bankruptcy protected, regardless of their losses. For all these 
reasons, they are expected not to be motivated enough to innovate –as regards both 
products and processes– reduce costs or improve the quality of products or services 
offered.  
 On the other hand, we could infer that after privatization the agency problem is 
relieved through the inclusion of control shareholders, since even in the case of public 
offering, the sale is accompanied by the constitution of a hard core of shareholders. In 
general terms, when companies are privatized and quoted they have to adjust to the 
discipline of the corporate control market. Control capacity of the goods-and-services 
market will depend on the level of competition resulting from privatization. 
Subsequently, we could expect that a single and coherent system of objectives will be 
elaborated after privatization. This system will probably be linked with a number of 
strategies designed to create significant wealth for shareholders by providing adequate 
top- management incentives, which, simultaneously, leads to new strategies and 
structures (Cuervo y Villalonga, 2000). 
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Organizational changes in privatized companies 
The internal structure of a company depends on the strategy adopted (Chandler, 
1962). However, in the case of public companies, strategies do not determine their 
internal structure as much as the singularities imposed by ownership structure, together 
with the coexistence of superimposed administrative controls intended to handle the 
persistent agency problem they are faced with.  
In fact, public companies are subjected to thorough public controls exercised 
simultaneously by the different authorities whose main concern is to verify observance 
of norms and regulations. Taking into account the fact that public responsibility, in 
contrast, is to be added to the various control systems, we find that the decision-taking 
process is highly concentrated in top management positions (D. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. 
R. Hinings and C. Turner, 1969; United Nations, 1974), which, in turn, will tend to 
transfer the problem to the tutelage authorities (J. García, 1984) and subsequently, 
responsibilities are often diluted. Eventually, nobody takes responsibility for the 
decisions taken and this reduces considerably any incentive to maximize value (A. 
Cuervo, 1995). 
Responsibility dilution favours the lack of initiative and administrative routines 
and procedures (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1969), in the same way as the 
multiple control systems do. Consequently, the level of formalization increases, at least 
apparently, since procedures are very often initiated only in response to problems or 
crisis that appear in variables monitored by the formal system as a result of ill-defined 
objectives and management interference3  (R. Martínez Nogueira, 1974). In fact, the 
public company organization does not seem to follow a traditional bureaucratic model, 
                                                           
3 which does not necessarily mean that public holdings which used to be dependent on the 
Ministry of Industry have not carried out systematic detailed processes of strategic planning, 
subjected to periodic revisions 
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which is hardly surprising if we consider that a private company has clear objectives 
and this favours a well-defined organization with a clear authority structure. The 
interplay of different groups of interest present in the public company, each with its own 
objectives, leads to continuous negotiation processes among them –both internal and 
external–, which sparks off the creation of shifting coalitions and makes it similar to the 
model proposed by R. M. Cyert  and J. G. March (1965) rather than the Weberian 
model. Table 1 summarizes some of the most relevant characteristics of internal 
organization in public companies. 
The shift from public to private sector is likely to favour the use of more suitable 
structures for the company. Therefore, privatized companies are expected to experience 
a number of organizational changes in order to fit in with their new environment and put 
their new strategies into practice. 
 
Table 1: Internal organization of public companies 
 
Characteristics of  state-owned 
companies 
 
 
Organizational structure 
 
Groups of interest, rent seekers 
 
Multiple, changeable and contradictory 
objectives 
 
 
Fluid structure, made up of shifting 
coalitions 
 
 
Multiple and thorough control systems 
 
High formalization (apparent) 
Centralized decision making 
Responsibility dilution 
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Innovation in privatized companies 
Structures such as the ones described above hardly favour innovation since they 
tend to be ‘inner-oriented’ and do not pay close attention to promotion and support of 
new ideas intended to improve products and processes. Likewise, these organizations 
are generally reluctant to change, which is also a drawback in terms of innovation. 
Nevertheless, innovation should not be a priority for these companies since their 
owners are not precisely demanding. There is not much point in introducing new ideas 
intended to provide a better service for their clients because they do not need to 
consolidate a competitive position in the market to generate profits. In fact, being 
bankruptcy-protected as they are, they lack the necessary motivation to innovate 
through more efficient processes which can be adapted to clients’ demands in terms of 
variety, delivery time and products designed to satisfy new needs or new ways of 
dealing with them. 
On the other hand, after privatization companies will have to respond to their 
shareholders’ interests and consolidate a competitive position in the market. In other 
words, they will have to adopt a market-oriented approach (D. Parker, 1995). Therefore, 
they are expected to speed up the pace of product and process innovation. 
 
Strategic changes in privatized companies. 
Companies’ behaviour includes the creation of new businesses and international 
expansion as well as abandonment of former activities and business lines. In both cases, 
public companies are expected to have some singularities. In fact, it is hard to think of 
public companies in terms of strategies.  Owing to the multiple and ill-defined nature of 
objectives, managers tend to have a higher level of autonomy when setting them up than 
during the decision-taking process intended to adopt a specific strategy so that 
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objectives can actually be achieved. Investments will certainly have to be approved by 
the control authorities. In this way, policies regarding employment, prices, location and 
foreign investment are already fixed (Aharoni, 1981, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, 
1994), that is, products and services are established beforehand, along with the clients –
sometimes even suppliers can be imposed (for example, they might need to be 
national)– technology, operation scale and places of settlement so as to satisfy criteria 
frequently based on economic-political reasons (such as cutting down unemployment in 
a particular region, replacing foreign technology, etc) and not purely financial reasons. 
Public companies are therefore expected to have single-business strategies 
whereas after privatization, innovation processes will lead to new products, which in 
turn will give rise to new businesses and the company will eventually diversify to 
increase its global reach and international expansion while reducing its links with the 
domestic market.   
Finally, the dynamic nature of these strategies entails the abandonment of former 
business lines. However, the various groups of interest present in public companies lead 
us to believe that getting rid of any specific activity (despite the losses, or lack of 
connection with the company strategy, if any) might not be an easy task. Even if there is 
no intention to suppress a specific activity but only to privatize it so that a coherent 
business model can be established, the unions are expected to object, driven by the loss 
of privileges they anticipate. This situation can obviously get worse if the intention is to 
eliminate the business altogether. Similarly, clients and suppliers will also oppose 
restructuring for similar reasons although their pressure capacity may not be as high as 
that of the labour force. 
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 Subsequently, restructuring and business lines revision are expected to increase 
after privatization. Table 2 shows a summary of the traditional strategic options in 
public companies along with the reasons behind them.  
 
Table 2: Corporate strategy in  public companies 
 
Possible strategic 
options 
 
Characteristics of state-owned companies 
 
 
 
Diversification, 
 
Internationalization 
 
Public purpose results in  single-business strategies. 
 
Public authorities control investments, business portfolios, 
location and installation capacity. 
 
Public companies administer  routine, short-term initiatives 
 
 
Restructuring 
 
Groups of interest will object; especially the unions will 
oppose the sale or abandonment of any business line. 
 
 
To sum up, privatized companies are expected to increase product and process 
innovation,  to adopt a more ambitious strategy in terms of businesses and international 
expansion and to design the necessary structures to put this strategy into practice, in 
other words, to build greater entrepreneurial capacity. Table 3 shows the expected 
changes in privatized companies as regards entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 3. Summary of expected relations between privatization and entrepreneurship. 
 
Entrepreneurship Dimensions Expected Relations 
 
Product Innovation  (PRODIN) 
Process Innovation (PROCIN) 
Organizational Innovation (ORGIN) 
Entry and creation of national  new businesses (NATEN) 
 
PRODIN  A > PRODIN  B 
PROCIN  A > PROCIN  B 
ORGIN  A > ORGIN  B 
NATEN  A > NATEN  B 
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Entry and creation of international  new businesses (INTEN) 
Strategic Renewal (STREN) 
INTEN  A > INTEN  B 
STREN  A > STREN  B 
 
* The subscript B y A in the Expected Relations column mean before and after 
privatization respectively. 
 
Competition and entrepreneurship 
However, privatization has a second facet as well: market deregulation and the opening-
up of these markets to competitors; which will presumably have a more immediate impact 
on entrepreneurship due to the competitors’ pressure. For this reason, we should consider 
not only the ownership shift  but also the extent of governmental regulation after 
privatization, since many of these companies belonged to different sectors regulated by 
the administration. 
In the open market, companies and their shares are interdependent and this fact 
has an influence on performance. Although the need to confront other companies 
compels them to introduce all kinds of changes –which can be generated from within 
the company or induced by competitors– much can also be learned from market 
competition. 
The greater the competition, the greater the overall pressure for firms to innovate 
for fear of falling behind competitors or even as an attempt to get ahead of them. After 
studying more than 3000 firms belonging to 200 sectors during the period between 1980 
and 1990, L. G. Thomas (1996) found that, unlike the previous period, the securities 
market views more favourably those companies operating in high-competition markets, 
for this is likely to favour innovation, growth and wealth. Similarly, G. Young, K. G. 
Smith and C. M. Grimm (1996) point out that as competition rises in a given sector so 
does its firms’ performance (in terms of sales margin and profitability) whereas, on the 
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contrary, there is no link between performance and the mechanisms involved in 
reducing competition. 
Therefore, an increased sensitivity to competition can itself hasten the adoption of 
innovations as regards products and processes, building thus  greater entrepreneurial 
capacity. In addition, privatized companies are also likely to revise their business 
portfolio (abandoning or entering new business, both domestic and international) and 
their management organization. 
 Table 4 shows the expected impact of new regulations and sector competition on 
the expected development of entrepreneurship in privatized companies. 
 
Table 4. Summary of expected relations between privatization and entrepreneurship 
after segmenting the sample according to sector competitive hostility. 
 
Entrepreneurship Dimensions Expected Relations 
 
 
Product Innovation  (PRODIN) 
Process Innovation (PROCIN) 
Organizational Innovation (ORGIN) 
Entry and creation of national  new businesses (NATEN) 
Entry and creation of international  new businesses (INTEN) 
Strategic Renewal (STREN) 
 
 
 
PRODIN  1 > PRODIN  2 
PROCIN  1 > PROCIN  2 
ORGIN  1 > ORGIN  2 
NATEN  1 > NATEN  2 
INTEN  1  > INTEN  2 
STREN  1 > STREN  2 
 
 
*Subscript 1 refers to companies exposed to stronger sector competition after 
privatization and subscript 2 refers to companies operating in similar levels of sector 
competition before and after privatization.  
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II. Methodology  
Population and Sample 
The survey sample was drawn from non-financial Spanish firms privatized 
between 1985 and 20004. Our aim is to analyse the organizational and strategic changes 
involved in the entrepreneurial orientation of companies after privatization. Therefore, 
we have excluded any company sold from 2001 onwards since we understand that a 
minimum of three years is required to assess the situation before and after privatization. 
Our survey includes state-owned companies which were privatized through holding 
companies or government departments during both the socialist administration 
(Socialist Party) and the conservative administration (Popular Party), regardless of their 
privatization mechanisms: a) public offering –and its variants: initial public offering 
(IPO) or public offering of the shares of companies listed on the Stock Exchange– b) 
direct selling or competitive tendering. Out of the total number of companies sold, only 
13 were sold through public offering, in spite of which they generated 90% of the 
income derived from privatization.  
Between 1985 and 2000, 105 non-financial companies were privatized (we 
provide information about these companies in Appendix I). For partial privatization, we 
have considered a double criterion to determine the privatization year:  the moment 
when the state is left with less than 50% of the company’s capital and the moment when 
the state loses control over the company (it is no longer in charge of appointing 
management positions5.) 
                                                           
4 Companies from the group Rumasa, which was expropriated in 1983, are not included since 
their experience in the public sector was only circumstantial. 
 
 
5 We consider this double criterion because a loss of majority ownership might not be enough to 
assess the effective disappearance of state intervention in the company’s decision taking. Such 
is the case of Telefónica, where the state kept control with 21% of the capital, and Repsol, with 
just 10%. 
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Once the companies were identified, we proceeded to obtain information through 
primary sources of information. Since objective data were not always easy to compile 
due to the fact that we required pre- and post-privatization information about companies 
which in some cases were sold more than 15 years ago, we had to employ subjective 
measures based on a questionnaire. To design the measures of entrepreneurship and 
competitive hostility (see APPENDIX II) we used a five-point Likert-type scale (1= 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
The questionnaire was finally sent to 79 companies after excluding those which 
had been dissolved and those which could not be located because they do not appear on 
the trade register6. The final usable sample contained 38 questionnaires, with an 
effective response rate of 38%. Table 5 shows some descriptive data of these companies 
as regards privatization process. 
 
Table5. Descriptive data. 
 
Characteristics Companies in 
the sample 
(%) 
Companies in 
the population 
(%) 
 
Privatization year 
 
 
 
Privatization mode 
 
 
 
- 1985-1991 
- 1992-1996 
- 1997-2000 
 
- Public offering 
- Direct selling or 
competitive 
 
21 
13 
66 
 
24 
71 
 
 
53 
17 
30 
 
10 
88 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
6 After drawing a preliminary test we made initial contact with the companies to identify the most suitable 
people to complete the questionnaire. In all cases we had to contact top managerial positions. Information 
gathering took place between April and September, 2003. One additional mailing was made a month after 
the initial mailing. We also contacted each company on the phone. 
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Institutional 
department 
 
 
tendering 
- Public offering and 
direct selling 
 
- Ministry of Industry 
and Energy (INI, 
INH, TENEO, AIE o 
SEPI) 
- Ministry of 
Economy and 
Treasury (D.G. State 
Patrimony Office or 
SEPPA) 
- Other institutions 
 
5 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Most of the companies completing the questionnaire were privatized from 1997 
onwards, that is, during the conservative administration. This is hardly surprising since 
as we move ahead in time it becomes harder for companies to complete the 
questionnaire. This period, characterized by intense privatization activity, corresponds 
to the implementation of the “Privatization Strategic Plan” agreed on the 28th of June, 
1996 at the cabinet meeting. 
As regards privatization mechanisms, it is worth noting the high percentage (24%) 
of companies privatized through public offering (with respect to the total percentage of 
public offerings in the population). This can be explained by the fact that most of these 
companies were sold  from 1997 onwards, which is the period when  this mechanism  
gains widespread popularity. 
Finally, we should like to point out that most of the companies completing the 
questionnaire belonged to the sphere of the former Ministry of Industry and Energy 
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(through the following holdings: INI, INH, TENEO, AIE and  SEPI) which explains the 
preponderance of these public companies compared with the total. 
 
Measures. 
Following the works of Zahra, Neubaum and  Huse (2000) and Zahra (1996), we 
developed measures for entrepreneurship using six dimensions: product innovation (5 
items), process innovation (4 items), organizational innovation (4 items) entry to 
Spanish markets, sectors or businesses (5 items), entry to foreign markets (3 items) and 
strategic renewal (4 items). Cronbach’s Alphas were higher than 0.75 for each 
dimension, both before and after privatization. We have used the mean to determine the 
measure for each case.   
To measure the changes in sector competition we have used the competitive 
hostility measure presented by S. A. Zahra and  D. O. Neubaum (1998) (4 ítems). 
Cronbach’s alpha was higher than 0.80. As we did with the different entrepreneurship 
indicators, we also used the mean to determine the measure. 
 
Statistical treatment of data 
Once the entrepreneurship measures have been calculated for pre-and post-privatization, 
and using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to check that in all cases they were normally 
distributed, we proceeded to contrast our predictions.  
For the first one, that is, after privatization companies are expected to build 
greater entrepreneurial capacity, we used the proportion test (p) and the T-test of 
differences between means for related samples. The proportion test enabled us to 
determine whether the proportion (p) of companies going through the expected changes 
exceeds random expectations, which proved to be the case, with a value above 50%. 
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The T-test of differences between means allowed us to assess whether the variables 
were statistically different from each other. A significance below 0.05 was confirmed. 
For our second prediction, that is, companies are expected to increase 
entrepreneurial capacity if the sector becomes more competitive, we proceeded to 
segment the sample according to the competitive characteristics of the sector. To do 
this, competitive hostility measures were made dichotomous, taking the following 
values: 0 when the level of sector competition was lower than or equal to 2.5, and 1 
when it was higher that 2.5. Therefore,  0 means low competition and 1 means high 
competition. The sample was then segmented into two groups, one subsample 
comprises those companies moving from a low sector competition to a high sector 
competition (group 1) and the second subsample comprises those companies operating 
in a sector whose level of competition remained the same after privatization (group 2). 
Simultaneously, we recognized two distinct situations in the second subsample: a) 
sector competition was low before and after privatization, and b) sector competition was 
high before and after privatization. After segmenting the sample, we proceeded to use 
the proportion test (p) and the T-test of differences between means for related samples 
once again. 
 
II Results 
This section presents the empirical results we found to evaluate the variation in 
entrepreneurship after privtization and the link between these changes and sector 
competition, since both elements can have an impact on the process of innovation, 
strategic and organizational changes.  
 
Changes in entrepreneurship. 
 20
As indicated in Table 6, there are  statistically significant differences for all 
dimensions of entrepreneurship except for process innovation. After privatization, 
companies feel impelled to adopt product and organizational innovations and to redefine 
their activity sphere, either entering new businesses or focusing on their core activity. 
Process innovation, on the other hand, does not experience a significant increase. The 
proportion test (p) also confirms these results except for process innovation.  More than 
50% of companies have shown to build greater entrepreneurial capacity. Process 
innovation had generally a high mean value before privatization (2.8) which might 
explain the lack of significant differences (almost 5%) after the ownership shift. This 
result, however,  requires deeper study. 
 
Table 6. Changes in Entrepreneurship 
 
Entrep. N Mean 
before 
Mean 
after 
Change 
in mean 
T Signif. p 
 
PRODIN 
 
PROCIN 
 
ORGIN 
 
NATEN 
 
INTEN 
 
STREN 
 
 
34 
 
33 
 
34 
 
36 
 
36 
 
35 
 
2,3706 
 
2,8106 
 
2,2353 
 
1,9324 
 
2,2963 
 
2,4714 
 
3,0431 
 
3,0808 
 
3,1471 
 
3,0292 
 
3,5463 
 
3,6286 
 
0,6725 
 
0,2702 
 
0,9118 
 
1,0968 
 
1,2500 
 
1,1571 
 
4,254 
 
1,852 
 
5,074 
 
7,101 
 
6,228 
 
6,281 
 
0,000 
 
0,073 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
 
64,71 
 
48,48 
 
67,65 
 
80,55 
 
75 
 
77,14 
 
 
Sample segmentation according to sector competition 
Changes in entrepreneurship after segmentation are reported in Table 7. 32% of 
the companies belong to group 1, that is, companies moving from a low sector 
competition to a high sector competition; whereas 68% belong to group 2, that is, 
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companies operating in a sector whose level of competition remained the same after 
privatization. Among these, 22%  had a low level of sector competition before and after 
privatization, and 78% had a high level of sector competition before and after 
privatization7. 
 
Table 7. Changes in entrepreneurship after segmenting the sample according to sector 
competitive hostility. 
 
Entrep. N Mean 
before 
Mean 
after 
Change in 
mean 
T Signif. p 
 
PRODIN 1 
PRODIN 2 
    PRODIN 2a 
    PRODIN 2b 
 
PROCIN 1 
PROCIN 2 
    PROCIN 2a 
    PROCIN 2b 
 
ORGIN 1 
ORGIN 2 
      ORGIN 2a 
      ORGIN 2b 
 
NATEN 1 
NATEN 2 
      NATEN 2a 
      NATEN 2b 
 
INTEN 1 
INTEN 2 
      INTEN 2a 
      INTEN 2b 
 
STREN 1 
STREN 2 
      STREN 2a 
      STREN 2b 
 
 
11 
21 
5 
16 
 
10 
21 
5 
16 
 
11 
21 
5 
16 
 
11 
23 
5 
18 
 
11 
23 
5 
18 
 
11 
22 
5 
17 
 
2,4000 
2,3524 
2,4000 
2,3375 
 
2,9250 
2,7381 
2,7000 
2,7500 
 
2,2273 
2,3095 
2,8000 
2,1563 
 
1,8667 
1,9971 
2,0000 
1,9963 
 
2,3030 
2,3333 
1,8000 
2,4815 
 
2,1591 
2,6591 
2,6500 
2,6618 
 
3,2424 
2,8857 
2,4000 
3,0375 
 
3,2167 
3,0238 
2,7000 
3,1250 
 
3,7273 
2,7857 
2,9500 
2,7344 
 
3,1818 
2,9217 
2,5600 
3,0222 
 
3,7576 
3,4348 
2,2667 
3,7593 
 
4,1818 
3,3977 
3,0000 
3,5147 
 
0,8424 
0,5333 
 
0,7000 
 
0,2917 
0,2857 
 
0,3750 
 
1,5000 
0,4762 
0,1500 
0,5781 
 
1,3152 
0,9246 
0,5600 
1,0259 
 
1,4545 
1,1014 
0,4667 
1,2778 
 
2,0227 
0,7386 
0,3500 
0,8529 
 
 
 
2,749 
2,808 
 
2,976 
 
1,265 
1,896 
 
1,936 
 
4,665 
2,776 
1,500 
2,645 
 
3,684 
5,641 
1,532 
5,656 
 
4,276 
4,271 
2,333 
4,062 
 
6,954 
3,661 
1,606 
3,424 
 
0,021 
0,011 
 
0,009 
 
0,237 
0,072 
 
0,072 
 
0,001 
0,012 
0,208 
0,018 
 
0,004 
0,000 
0,200 
0,000 
 
0,002 
0,000 
0,080 
0,001 
 
0,000 
0,001 
0,184 
0,003 
 
72,73 
52,17 
0,00 
75,00 
 
60,00 
39,13 
0,00 
56,25 
 
90,91 
47,83 
40,00 
56,25 
 
90,91 
77,91 
40,00 
83,33 
 
90,91 
65,22 
60,00 
66,66 
 
100,00 
60,87 
40,00 
70,59 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 We have excluded one case in which the company moved from a high level of sector 
competition to a low level of sector competition.  
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We observe that significant differences are maintained in the segmented sample 
for all entrepreneurship dimensions except for process innovation, which is consistent 
with the results before segmentation. In general terms, these results show that during the 
post-privatization regime, companies build greater entrepreneurial capacity, whether 
their sector competition is altered (group 1) or not (group 2). 
The fact that there are no significant differences in the results after segmentation 
could lead us to believe that changes in sector competition are not a determinant factor 
in the entrepreneurial behaviour of companies after privatization. However, we should 
keep a cautious eye on this assumption for the following reasons: 
Firstly, the proportion test (p) shows that the percentage of companies modifying 
their behaviour as expected is higher when sector competition becomes more aggressive 
(group 1), as opposed to those operating in sectors where competition remains at the 
same level (group 2). Even for process innovation, p is higher that 50% in companies 
belonging to group 1. 
 Secondly, if we observe the results for group 2 and study the situation for low 
competition (subgroup 2a) and high competition (subgroup 2b) we realise that 
significant differences appear only in the second case (subgroup 2b), although the 
percentage of companies in this subgroup behaving as expected is generally lower than 
that of companies which have actually experienced a more aggressive sector 
competition after privatization (group 1). 
 Therefore, we can conclude that companies build greater entrepreneurial 
capacity when faced with a more aggressive sector competition after privatization, 
either because there is a competition increase or because they were already operating in 
a highly competitive sector. Summing up, we can say that alterations in sector 
competition seem to be as determinant as the levels of competition previous to 
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privatization. A more aggressive competition in terms of price, quality, service and new 
products leads to a higher percentage of companies building greater entrepreneurial 
capacity. 
 
IV     Conclusion 
Privatization modifies the complex agency relation present in public companies 
and this, in turn,  is likely to modify its strategic behaviour as well. Particularly, these 
companies are expected to build greater entrepreneurial capacity and implement 
innovation policies to initiate new activities and revise the ongoing projects. 
Specifically, organizational problems derived from the lack of clear objectives and 
multiple control systems are expected to disappear. Likewise, the ownership shift will 
induce the adoption of new incentive systems in line with the objectives set up by 
shareholders. All these changes give rise to a more dynamic strategic behaviour oriented 
to entering and exiting new businesses and countries. 
Using a sample of 38 companies, we analysed the impact of privatization on the 
strategic and entrepreneurial capacity of non-financial public companies sold in Spain 
between 1985 and 2000. 
From this sample we learn that after privatization companies introduce innovation 
policies –in terms of products, processes and organization–, develop new businesses at 
national level, consolidate international activity and initiate strategic renewal processes. 
It is then confirmed that at least for a three-year period following privatization, 
companies build greater entrepreneurial capacity (compared with the same three-year 
period previous to the ownership shift).  
These results are also confirmed after the sample was segmented according to 
sector competition. In this case, entrepreneurship improves significantly in privatized 
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companies operating in sectors exposed to higher competition levels after privatization, 
and also when sector competition is not subject to changes during the post-privatization 
regime. This is especially true for high-competition sectors. Therefore, it seems that in 
order to explain  the differences in entrepreneurship after privatization, we should 
consider not only the case when sector competition is altered but also the degree of 
competition faced by companies, which has proved to be a determinant factor. 
On the other hand, the data available do not allow us to explain the exact reasons 
for this entrepreneurial improvement. A larger sample of companies would have 
allowed us to use statistical techniques to isolate the privatization impact. Subsequently, 
we can only support the idea that, whatever the reasons, privatized companies build 
greater entrepreneurial capacity during the post-privatization regime. 
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APPENDIX I. Privatized companies in Spain 1985-2000 
This table includes all companies satisfying the double criterion adopted here (the state loses over 50% and its effective control over the 
company) between 1985-2000. Financial and industrial development companies are excluded. 
  
 COMPANIES PRIVATIZED THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND ENERGY (INI, INH, TENEO, AIE, SEPI) 
  
Privatization 
year 
Company Parent 
company 
Sector Buyer % sold privatization year Type of sale 
1985 Cesquisa Enisa Chemistry Cepsa 45,4 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 Igfisa Endiasa Food Pleamar 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 Ingenasa Enisa Biotechnology ERT 51 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 Marsans INI Turism Trapsatur 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 Secoinsa INI Computing Fujitsu 69,1 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 SKF Española INI Mechanics 
(bearings) 
Aktiebogalet SKF 98,8 DIRECT SELLING 
1985 Textil Tarazona INI Textile Cima Eursa (Entrecanales) 69,6 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Aluflet Alúmina 
Española 
Aluminum Aluflet´s private shareholders 40 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Amper  Electronics Multiple 68 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1986 Entursa INI Turism CIGA/Hoteles de Lujo Españoles 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Fovisa Made Iron and Steel GKN 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Frigsa Endiasa Food Saprogal 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Gypisa Endiasa Food Frigoríficos Santana/Los Norteños 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Indugasa Seat Automobile GKN 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Insisa BWE Team goods Insisa´s private shareholders 60 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Issa Inespal Aluminum Aluperfil 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 La Luz Carcesa Food Prevert 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Motores MBD Motores 
Barreras/Sodiga
Shipbuilding Klockner Humboldt Deutz AG 38,4 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Pamesa Ence Paper Torras Hostench 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Remetal Inespal Aluminum Remetal´s founding partners 66,1 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 SEAT INI Automobile Volkswagen 75 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Telesincro Inisel Electronics Bull 40 DIRECT SELLING 
1986 Tovisa  Team goods Gekanor 99,3 DIRECT SELLING 
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1987 Alumalsa Inespal Aluminum Montupet 44 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Dessa Bazán/Astano Shipbuilding Forestal del Atlántico 80 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Diasa Endiasa Food Saudisa (Promodes)/BBV 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Evatsa Inespal Aluminum Cebal 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Litofan Inespal Aluminum Baumgartner Ibérica 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Miel Española Endiasa Food Sugemesa (Agrolimen) 51 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Miraflores Lactaria 
Castellana (INI)
Food Queserías Miraflores  DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Purolator INI Automobile Knecht Filterwerke 97,4 DIRECT SELLING 
1987 Vitorio 
Luzuriaga 
INI 
 
Automobile Eisenwerk Bruhl 33,3 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Ancoal Enisa Aluminum Omnium Industrie 75,2 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Astican INI Shipbuilding 
(shipyards) 
Italmar 90,7 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Ateinsa INI Team goods Gec Alsthom 85 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Enfersa INI Fertilizers Ercros 80 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 MTM INI Team goods Gec Alsthom 85 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Oesa Endiasa Food Ferruzzi 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Pesa Inisel Electronics Amper 97,4 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Adaro 
Indonesia 
Enadimsa (INI) Engineering Indonesia Coal/Asmincco Bara 
Utama/ TirtamasMajutamas 
80 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Saldosa INI Mining Potasas Sub. 66 DIRECT SELLING 
1991 Enasa INI Automobile Iveco/Fiat 60 DIRECT SELLING 
1991 Grupo de 
Empresas 
Álvarez 
(Geasa) 
INI Industrial- 
handicraft 
Pickman (Estudesa) 90 DIRECT SELLING 
       
1991 TSD Enosa (INI) Electronics Telepublicaciones 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1992 Campsa INH Petrochemicals   DIRECT SELLING 
1992 Icuatro Iniexport (INI) Medical equipment Grupo Alegre 100  DIRECT SELLING 
1993 Automoción 
2000 
Teneo Automobile Inversores Reo 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1993 Fábrica De  
San. Carlos 
Teneo Team goods Grupo Navacel /Total Technical 
Trade/Luis Tellería Usabiaga 
100 DIRECT SELLING 
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1993 Palco Inespal (INI) Aluminum Alcan Deutschland 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 Artespaña Teneo Industrial-handicraft Medino 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 ASDL Ceselsa (Teneo) Aeronautics Quadrant Group 86,7 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 Caivsa INH/Madrileña 
lud. y Calef. 
por gas 
Gas Gas Natural 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 Compañía 
Transatlántica 
Teneo Sea transport  Naviera de Odiel/Marítima 
Valenciana  
100 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 Enagas INH Gas Gas natural 91 DIRECT SELLING 
1995 Refinalsa Inespal (INI) Aluminum Remetal 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1995 Sidenor AIE Iron and Steel Digeco-Roda 
(Digeco/Olarra/Rodaccial) 
50 DIRECT SELLING 
1996 Almagrera SEPI Mining Navan Resources 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1996 Gas Natural SEPI Gas Multiple 3,81 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1996 Sefanitro AHV/SEPI Fertilizers Fertiberia 52,65 DIRECT SELLING 
 
 
1997 Aceralia AIE Iron and Steel Arbed/Gestamp y Aristrain/Multiple 100 DIRECT SELLING 
and   PUBLIC 
OFFERING 
1997 Auxini SEPI Construction OCP 60 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Elcano SEPI Transport (shipping 
company) 
Grupo Marítimo Ibérico 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Ferroperfil SEPI Aluminum Directivos (MBO) 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Hijos J. 
Barreras 
SEPI Shipbuilding 
(shipyards) 
Grupo Barreras 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Inespal SEPI Aluminum Alcoa 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Iongraf Inespal/SEPI Aluminum Directivos (MBO) 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Repsol SEPI Oil/Gas Multiple 10 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Surgiclinic Plus Santa 
Bárbara/SEPI 
Medical products Grupo Hambros 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1998 Comee SEPI Electricity National and foreign institutional 
investors 
100 COMPETITIVE 
TENDERING 
1998 Endesa SEPI Electricity (energy) Multiple 33 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1998 Grupo Potasas SEPI Mining/chemistry Dead Sea Works/Tolsa/La Seda de 
Barcelona 
100 DIRECT SELLING 
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1998 Inima SEPI Environment Grupo Lain  100 DIRECT SELLING 
1998 Prod. Tubulares SEPI(AIE) Iron and Steel Tubos Reunidos 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 Astander SEPI Shipbuilding 
(shipyards) 
Italmar 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 Casa SEPI Aeronautics EADS 99,28 Incorporation into 
European group 
       
1999 Enatcar SEPI Transport (road 
transport) 
Alianza Bus 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 Iberia SEPI Trasport (airfreight) Multiple 68,51 Public offering, 
Industrial/ 
Institucional 
Alliance 
1999 Icsa-Aya SEPI Aeronautics Mecanizaciones Aeronaúticas 
(MASA) 
100 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 Indra SEPI I.T Multiple 66,09 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1999 Initec SEPI Engineering Técnicas Reunidas /Welco/Dragados 
Industrial 
100 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 LM Composites SEPI Team goods Lm Glasfiber 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1999 Red Eléctrica SEPI Electricity Multiple 31,5  PUBLIC OFFERING 
1999 TGI SEPI Technology Doxa Consultores 100 DIRECT SELLING 
2000 Santa Bárbara SEPI Armored vehicles 
and weapons 
 
General Dinamics Corporation 100 DIRECT SELLING 
  
  
  
 COMPANIES PRIVATIZED THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND TREAUSURY (STATE PATRIMONY 
OFFICE OR SEPPA) 
  
Privatization 
year 
Company Parent 
company 
Sector Buyer % sold privatization year Type of sale 
1985 Gossypium Intelhorce 
(DGPE) 
Textile Textil Guadiana 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1989 Intelhorce DGPE Textile Orefici 100 DIRECT SELLING 
 34
1990 Coifer Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Food Alimentos Naturales (BBV) 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Dirsa Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Distribution Diasa (Promodes/BBV) 75 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Hytasa DGPE Textile Textil Guadiana 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Imepiel DGPE Shoe industry Grupo Cusí 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Salinas 
Torrevieja 
DGPE Chemistry (salt) U. Salinera de España (Solvay) 38,5 DIRECT SELLING 
1990 Seb. de la 
Fuente 
Dirsa (DGPE) 
O Tabacalera 
Distribución Cofidisa/BBV 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1991 Coisa Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Food Rústicas 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1991 Fridarago Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Food Rústicas 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1994 RJR 
Alimentación8 
Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Food RJR Nabisco 50 DIRECT SELLING 
1995 Lesa Tabacalera 
(DGPE) 
Food Leyma/Iparlat 100 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Aldeasa SEPPA Distribution Multiple and Tabacalera9  95,04 DIRECT SELLING 
and    PUBLIC 
OFFERING 
1997 Telefónica DGPE/SEPPA Telecommunications Multiple 20,69 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1997 Tisa SEPPA Telecommunications Telefónica 23,8 DIRECT SELLING 
1998 Serausa SEPPA Distribution (service 
areas) 
Áreas 100 COMPETITIVE 
TENDERING 
1998 Tabacalera SEPPA 
(DGPE) 
Food 
(tobacco) 
Multiple 52,36 PUBLIC OFFERING 
  
  
                                                           
8 1994 was considered to be the privatization year of RJR Alimentación, since in 1993 Tabacalera sold  98,93 % of Royal Brands to RJR Alimentación, with a 50% capital 
share in Tabacalera. Royal Brands includes Carcesa, Consiber, Artiach, Marbú. 
 
9  65.04% was sold through public offering. 
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 COMPANIES PRIVATIZED THROUGH OTHER  INSTITUTIONS 
  
Privatization 
year 
Company Parent 
company 
Sector Buyer % sold privatization year Type of sale 
1987 Acesa F.G.D. Motorways Multiple 57,6 PUBLIC OFFERING 
1991 Jobac Mercasa Distribution Erosmer 70 DIRECT SELLING 
1993 Ineco Renfe Engineering  55 DIRECT SELLING 
1997 Retevisión Ministerio de 
Fomento 
Telecommunications Endesa-STET 70 DIRECT SELLING 
  
Source: Self-elaboration from information provided by the  Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales and the Consejo Consultivo de Privatizaciones.  
We have also used information from Cuervo (1997); Gámir (1999); Villalonga (2000);  Bel and Costas (2001) and newspaper articles. 
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APPENDIX II. Measures. 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurship: respondents were asked to assess the following statements 
before and after privatization. We used a five-point Likert-type scale for this purpose (1: 
strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: undecided, 4: agree and  5: strongly agree). 
 
Before 
privatization 
After 
privatization 
 
-    + -    +
Product innovation α = 0,8922 α = 0,9018 
a. Being the first company in your industry to introduce new products to 
the market 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Creating radically new products for sale in new markets 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Creating radically new products for sale in the company’s existing 
markets 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Commercializing new products 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Investing heavily in cutting edge product-oriented R¬D. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Process innovation α = 0,8186 α = 0,8369 
a. Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R¬D 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Being the first company in the industry to develop and introduce 
radically new technologies 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Pioneering the creation of new process technologies 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Copying other companies’ process technologies (reversed) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Organizational innovation α = 0,9078 α = 0,9008 
a. Being the first in the industry to develop innovative management 
systems 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Being the first in the industry to introduce new business concepts and 
practices 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Changing the organizational structure in significant  ways to promote 
innovation 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Introducing innovative human resource programs to spur creativity and 
innovation 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Domestic venturing α = 0,8318 α = 0,8025 
a. Entering new domestic markets 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Promoting new domestic business creation 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Diversifying into new industries in Spain 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Supporting and financing domestic new venture and start-up activities 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Acquiring companies in very different industries 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
International venturing α = 0,8828 α = 0,8413 
a. Entering new foreign markets 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Expanding your international operations 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Supporting and financing start-up business activities dedicated to 
international operations 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Strategic renewal α = 0,8181 α = 0,7959 
a. Divesting several unprofitable business units 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Changing its competitive approach (strategy) for each business units 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Initiating several programs to imprové the productivity of business 
units 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Reorganizing operations to ensure increased coordination and 
communication among business units 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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Sector competition hostility: respondents were asked to assess the following 
statements regarding the level of sector competition where the company developed its 
core activity. 
 
 
Before 
privatization 
After 
privatization 
 
-    + -    +
 α = 0,7946 α = 0,8100 
a. Competition based on quality is fierce 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Competition based on price is fierce 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Competition based on service is fierce 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Competition based on product newness is fierce 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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